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Summary 
In December 2016, a Belgian court referred questions to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the issuance of humanitarian visas 
to a Christian Syrian family. The central question in the case is whether inter-
national treaties and Union law oblige EU Member States to allow their con-
sulates and embassies to issue humanitarian visas. This thesis discusses the 
outcome of that judgement, and the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, 
in an attempt to understand what the future for humanitarian visas in the EU 
might hold.  
 
Humanitarian visas are constructed as to provide safe and legal access to a 
state’s territory, allowing the final asylum claim determination procedure to 
take place on the territory of the potential host state. Currently in the EU, 
however, a prerequisite for seeking asylum is to be on a Member States’ ter-
ritory, which has resulted in an estimated 90% of all asylum seekers entering 
Europe in an irregular way.  
 
As argued by the Advocate General in X and X, the Visa Code, which estab-
lishes the harmonised procedures and conditions for issuing Schengen visas 
for short stays or transits in the Schengen Area, could offer such humanitarian 
visas, through so called LTVs, or visas with limited territorial validity. Ac-
cording to the Visa Code, such visas may be offered in exceptional circum-
stances, when a Member State considers it necessary to derogate from the 
common entry conditions for reasons of national interest, on humanitarian 
grounds or because of its international obligations.  
 
The essential difference between Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion and 
the Court’s judgement is whether or not the situation before the referring court 
can be considered an application for a visa with limited territorial validity in 
accordance with the Visa Code. For, if the situation falls within the scope of 
the Visa Code, this would oblige Member State authorities to act in accord-
ance with the rights guaranteed under the Charter and ECHR. If the opposite 
conclusion is reached, however, not only does the situation before the referred 
court fall outside the scope of the Visa Code, but also outside the scope of EU 
law.  
 
For while the Court considers it apparent that as the purpose of the application 
differs from that of a short-term visa, thus falling outside the scope of the EU 
law, the Advocate General reaches a very different conclusion. Contrary to 
the Court, Advocate General Mengozzi considers that the situation in the na-
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tional court falls within the scope of the Visa Code, and that it must be cov-
ered by the humanitarian grounds in Article 25 of the Visa Code. Further, 
Mengozzi argues that EU law requires Member States to issue an LTV visa, 
if the alleged humanitarian grounds are well-founded. 
 
After the judgement, some academics have accused the Court of ‘taking the 
politically easy way out’ and indulging the concerns of the Member States. 
Further, some have expressed confusion as to why the Court has shied away 
from extending the applicability of the Charter to those in need of its protec-
tion, especially at a time when EU asylum policy has raised questions con-
cerning the Union’s “self-professed dedication to human rights”. It seems that 
the future for humanitarian visas in the European Union is at a crossroads. 
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human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
“It is, in my view, crucial that, at a time when borders are closing, and 
walls are being built, the Member States do not escape their responsi-
bilities, as they follow from EU law or, if you will allow me the expres-
sion, their EU law and our EU law.”1 
 
The statement above was made by Advocate General Mengozzi in the Opin-
ion of the high-profile case C-638/16, X and X concerning humanitarian visas 
in the European Union. This has resulted in the re-emergence of the discus-
sion on humanitarian visas to, and in, the European Union (EU). However, as 
is illustrated below, while humanitarian visas as a concept received plenty of 
attention around the time of the judgement, the concept, and the discussion 
surrounding it, is in itself nothing new. 
 
Back in 2002, humanitarian visas where examined in a study for the European 
Commission, only to resurface in the 2006 Green Paper on Asylum and going 
on to become the focus of the 2009 Stockholm Programme. Further, the 2013 
Task Force Mediterranean Communication states that “opening up of legal 
channels to safely access the European Union should be explored”.2  
 
Since that statement, however, momentum seems to have been lost. Instead, 
the new focus, especially after the joint EU-Turkey Statement in 2016, is vol-
untary resettlement and safe third countries. As an indication of this new ap-
proach, any reference to humanitarian visas disappeared from the 2015 Euro-
pean Agenda on Migration, where discussions concerning legal channels 
where replaced with increased border controls and cooperation with third 
countries, in order to prevent hazardous journeys to the EU.3 
 
However, with the CJEU’s judgement, along with the acclaimed Opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi, humanitarian visas might be regaining momen-
tum. Although the CJEU ruled against the use of the Visa Code in the way 
argued by the Advocate General, the case might just have reignited the dis-
cussion on humanitarian visas in the EU.  
                                               
1 Case C-638/16 PPU, AG Opinion, para 4. 
2 Task Force Mediterranean Communication, p. 13. 
3 Moreno-Lax (2017B). 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to describe and understand the concept 
of humanitarian visas in the European Union; both when it was first intro-
duced as a viable option, but also why it has lost momentum, and what its 
future prospects are. This will be done by examining the judgement, and the 
Advocate General Opinion, in CJEU Case C-638/16 X and X, as this is the 
most significant case concerning humanitarian visas in recent years.  
 
The aim is to use the above-mentioned case in order to explain said develop-
ments, and to try to highlight the dichotomic opinions that continue to sur-
round the concept of humanitarian visas. Why were humanitarian visas seen 
as a possible solution for so long, only to later disappear from official docu-
ments? How does the CJEU case fit into this development, and what alterna-
tive solutions have been presented? In an attempt to analyse the future of the 
humanitarian visa concept in the European Union, abovementioned questions 
and aspects will be scrutinised. 
1.3 Research Questions 
In light of the above purpose, the research questions are as follows: 
 
- How did Advocate General Mengozzi and the CJEU, respectively, 
argue in Case C-638/16 X and X? 
 
- Why might they have reasoned as they did? 
 
- Does the judgement have any significance for the future of humani-
tarian visas in EU law, and what might such a future entail? 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis will not focus on the issues of immigration and the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System at large, nor will the EU Visa System be discussed in 
any greater detail. Likewise, the suggested Recast Visa Code is only men-
tioned in passing. Similarly, although there is significant case law that is in-
terlinked with, or touches upon, the issues discussed in CJEU Case C-638/16 
X and X, these will not be covered, with a few exceptions.  
 
Further, when national humanitarian visa systems are mentioned, this is done 
in passing, and the thesis does not claim to cover either all the existing hu-
manitarian visa programmes within the EU Member States, or those few that 
are mentioned in their entirety. Furthermore, both the Recast Visa Code, and 
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the Dublin System, are only mentioned in passing, and only the aspects rele-
vant to the present thesis. Finally, as regards the human rights standards that 
are cited, both on a regional and international level, only the aspects deemed 
relevant are mentioned, and the material is far from comprehensive. 
1.5 Material 
The main source of material for this thesis is the judgement, along with the 
Advocate General reasoning, in CJEU Case 638/16 X and X. To supplement 
this material, and to facilitate a deeper understanding, doctrine commenting 
on the case has also been used. Further, legal documents, and to a certain 
extent other case law, have been consulted in an attempt to illustrate the sig-
nificance of the case. Due to a lack of recent material discussing humanitarian 
visas in the EU, a lot of the doctrine discussing this concept is a few years 
old, but I have still deemed it relevant.  
 
Additionally, material from various EU institutions, such as the Commission 
and the European Parliament, have been examined, in order to highlight the 
concept of humanitarian visas in the EU at various points in time. Finally, the 
idea of safe third countries has been briefly reviewed, in part as it surfaced in 
X and X, but also due to its growing significance in the EU migration legal 
field. 
1.6 Method 
In the following thesis, in an attempt to answer my abovementioned research 
questions, the traditional legal dogmatic method will be used. The legal dog-
matic method is based on the study of legislation, jurisprudence and doctrine, 
and its purpose is to recreate and describe the normative system of legal 
rules.4 This is done by systemising and interpreting the relevant legal sources 
in order to discern the meaning of the relevant law.5  
 
As this thesis focuses primarily on EU law and sources of EU law, the legal 
dogmatic method will be used in combination with an EU legal method. There 
is, however, not one EU legal method, but rather a plethora of different ones. 
Instead, EU legal method is an approach used to manage EU legal sources, 
keeping in mind that EU law exists simultaneously on two levels; both at the 
Union level and at the national level.6 The EU’s competence derives from 
                                               
4 Jareborg (2004) p. 8. 
5 Sandgren (2015) p. 43 ff. 
6 Hettne &,Otken Eriksson (2005) p. 81. 
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three central principles; the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and propor-
tionality. These principles are regulated in Article 5 TFEU, which also states 
the limits and use of these competences.  
 
The main source of the thesis is the Court’s judgement, along with Advocate 
General Mengozzi’s Opinion, in Case C-638/16 X and X. Thus, the main part 
of this thesis constitutes a commentary of both the Court’s and the Advocate 
General’s reasoning. At the time of writing, there has been extremely limited 
doctrinal commentary of X and X, making the process of interpreting the case, 
and its significance for the EU asylum legal field, complicated. In an attempt 
to rectify this, I have relied heavily on the case itself, along with older doctrine 
concerning humanitarian visas in the EU. 
 
The sources of international law, according to Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute)7 are conventions, customary law 
and general principles.8 The primary tools of interpretation are set out in Ar-
ticles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In 
so far as this thesis touches upon international law, the international legal 
dogmatic method will be used, in order to distinguish the content of interna-
tional law from its sources.9 
1.7 Research Status 
Since the Court’s ruling in X and X in early 2017, there has been very little 
extensive doctrinal commentary, with the exception of posts in a few EU or 
asylum law blogs. This is in line with what seems to be a general trend con-
cerning humanitarian visas, that is, a lack of interest in recent years. One can 
only speculate on the reasons for this, be it the lack of political will or the 
sensitive issue that migration has become in the EU, but the end result remains 
the same; in the last decade there has been little doctrinal commentary. 
 
Notably, Professor Gregor Noll’s dissertation Negotiating Asylum: the EU 
acquis, extraterritorial protection and the common market of deflection from 
2000 discusses both the concept of humanitarian visas in some dept, as well 
as examining third safe countries and readmission agreements. The disserta-
tion has proven helpful in the writing of this thesis and filled a void when it 
was written. However, as it was published nearly two decades ago, there is a 
                                               
7 San Francisco 26 June 1945. 
8 Note that Article 38 of the ICJ Statue corresponds to customary international law. 
9 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with annex). Concluded in Vienna on 23 May 
1969. 
12 
 
need for new material. Here, Helen O’Nions’ Asylum – a right denied: a crit-
ical analysis of European asylum policy from 2014 has provided some guid-
ance. 
 
Despite this, there seems to be a clear need for more research into humanitar-
ian visas in the EU, as especially the potential interconnectedness between 
humanitarian visas and the concept of safe third countries. For it seems when 
the one falls from grace; the other has taken its place. Likewise, further ex-
amination of individual Member States asylum legislation regarding human-
itarian visa schemes would be welcomed, as it is currently difficult to get a 
clear overview.  
1.8 Structure 
The second chapter of this thesis begins by briefly introducing the relevant 
international human rights law concerning the issues of human rights and mi-
gration. Focusing on the regional perspective, the third chapter will discuss 
migration and asylum issues in the European Union; both the historical de-
velopment and its current form. Here, the Dublin System and the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) will also be examined. The fourth chapter 
concerns the concept of safe third countries and readmissions agreements, in-
cluding some critique that has been made against the two. The fifth chapter 
describes humanitarian visas and looks at the reception it has gotten within 
the European Union and individual Member States. The sixth chapter outlines 
Case C-638/16 X and X, presenting both the Advocate General’s arguments, 
and those in the Court’s judgement. Finally, chapter seven summarizes case 
X and X, while also presenting some doctrinal commentary. Concluding the 
thesis, some speculations about the future of humanitarian visas are presented. 
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2. Relevant International Law 
International law protects the dignity and rights of all persons, regardless of 
nationality or other factors. However, international law does not exist in a 
vacuum, and is thus affected by the politics of border control.10 The right to 
seek and enjoy asylum was first given universal recognition in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.11 Here, Article 14 of the 
UDHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other coun-
tries asylum from persecution”. However, it is important to note that neither 
Article 14, nor the UDHR, generally possess the qualities of binding interna-
tional law.12  
 
Further, each sovereign state, in line with the theory of territorial sovereignty, 
ultimately decides who is and is not allowed onto their territory.13 It is im-
portant to note that although there is a right to leave a state, even one’s own, 
there is no corresponding right to enter a state’s territory.14 
2.1 The Refugee Convention 
In 1950, the United Nation’s General Assembly established a permanent ref-
ugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinaf-
ter: UNHCR) through a resolution that also constitutes UNHCR’s statute.15 
The main instrument of the UNHCR is the 1951 UN Convention relating to 
the status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Convention). 16  
 
The states that have acceded or ratified the 1951 Convention have agreed that 
the term ‘refugee’ should apply to any person considered a refugee under ear-
lier international agreements, but also any person who qualifies as a refugee 
under the (UNHCR) statute.17 Thus, Convention refugees are identifiable as 
they must possess four elemental characteristics; (1) they are outside their 
country of origin, (2) they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves to the 
protection of that country, or to return there, (3) such inability or unwilling-
ness is attributable to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, and (4) the 
                                               
10 O’Nions (2014) p. 1. 
11 UN GA Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) 
of 10 December 1948. 
12 Noll (2000) p. 362. 
13 Linderfalk (2012) p. 17. 
14 See Article 13.2 UDHR, Article 12.2 and 12.4 ICCPR. 
15 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGA Res-
olution 428 (V), adopted on 14 December 1950. 
16 Iben Jensen (2014) p. 3. 
17 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) p. 18. 
14 
 
persecution feared is based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group, or political opinion.18 
 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, which is binding not only to the State 
Parties to the instrument, but also to those who have ratified the 1967 New 
York Protocol,19 reads as follows: 
 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger 
to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been con-
victed by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes 
a danger to the community of that country.”20 
 
From this it becomes clear that the prohibition of refoulement is not an abso-
lute one, as illustrated in the second paragraph of the article. Further, it is 
unclear when a person is to be regarded as a ‘danger to the security’ or a 
‘danger to the community’ for a potential host country.21 It has also been 
claimed that the prohibition of refoulement constitutes a part of customary 
international law.22 
2.2 The 1984 CAT Convention 
The 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment (CAT)23 limits the rights of states to remove 
aliens in its third article: 
 
“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subject to torture.”24 
 
CAT generally outlaws torture as well as cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. However, the scope of the removal position in Article 3 
is limited to torture. Due to the fundamental character of the prohibition of 
                                               
18 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) p.18 f. 
19 See Art. 1 (1) of the New York Protocol. 
20 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.  
21 Noll (2000) p. 363. 
22 Noll (2000) p. 363. 
23 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
24 Article 3 CAT. 
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torture, CAT does not provide derogation in exceptional cases, and thus the 
prohibition of torture is absolute.25  
2.3 Other Protection 
The principle of non-refoulement can be found in other instruments than the 
Refugee Convention and CAT however. Article 7 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: ICCPR) states that “[n]o one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. The article has been interpreted as to include a prohibition of 
refoulement.26 Further, the principle of non-refoulement constitutes interna-
tional customary law.27 
 
Important to note is that there is no right to extraterritorial protection in nei-
ther Article 14 UDHR, nor in Common Article 3 and 32 of the Geneva Con-
vention relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War28 (Fourth 
Geneva Convention).29 However, when the claimant is situated within a po-
tential host state or at its borders, states are obliged to refrain from re-
foulement.30  
 
On the regional level, well-established jurisprudence from the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) has found that despite the lack 
of an express non-refoulement provision in the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (hereinafter: ECHR), such a prohibition was ‘already inherent in 
the general terms of article 3’.31 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 Noll (2000) p. 365. 
26 Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 31, para. 12. 
27 The Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol (2001), 
preamble 4. 
28 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Fourth Geneva Convention), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 August 
1949. 
29 Noll (2000) p. 595. 
30 See Article 33 GC, Article 3 CAT, Article 45 FC; Article 3 ECHR and Article ICCPR. 
31 Soering v. United Kingdom, para. 88; Gil-Bazo (2015). 
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3. The European Union and 
Asylum – A Brief 
Introduction 
In order to put this thesis into context, it is essential to briefly discuss and 
outline the European Union’s relationship with asylum and migration issues. 
How migration is currently regulated in the EU, and how this current system 
has come into being, are some of the issues that will be discussed in this chap-
ter. 
3.1 The Development of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) 
Policies of migration have been a Community concern as far back as 1974, 
although at first the primary focus was ensuring the free movement of Euro-
pean labour.32 However, with the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, 
work began to develop and consolidate the internal European market, requir-
ing the Member States to cooperate on policies concerning the entry, move-
ment and residence of third country nationals.33 At around the same time, the 
Schengen Agreement was established and enacted between the five signatory 
states.34 
 
The following year, the Ad Hoc Group for Migration was created, tasked with 
reviewing how unauthorised migration could be prevented in the Schengen 
area, and thus a platform was formed, although still formally outside the scope 
of European law, linking common border policies with the goal of preventing 
irregular migration.35 Additionally, in 1995, when the 1990 Schengen Con-
vention came into force, a single external border was established in the 
Schengen area.36 Finally, the Schengen acquis became a formal part of EU 
law after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and the Schengen area itself has 
since grown significantly.37 
 
                                               
32 O’Nions (2014) p. 73. 
33 OJ L169 29 June 1987. 
34 The Schengen Acquis – Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders OJ L239, 22 September 2000.  
35 O’Nions (2014) p. 73. 
36 European Council The Schengen Acquis. As Referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Deci-
sion 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 OJ L 176 10 July 1999. 
37 O’Nions (2014) p. 74. 
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Both Schengen and the Ad Hoc Group on Migration were intergovernmental 
undertakings, and apart from the Council, the EU institutions had limited 
roles. Further, while the Schengen acquis and the Ad Hoc Group had similar 
strategies and objectives, they differed in terms of their institutional ‘loca-
tion’, with Schengen outside the EU legal system, and the Ad Hoc Group a 
Council body. Due to this, at the end of the 1980s, there were two parallel 
institutions through which the Member States could coordinate their asylum 
and migration policies for internal security purposes.38 This had the effect of 
ultimately making interior officials the decisionmakers regarding EU’s asy-
lum and migration policies, and the ‘securitarian’ approach that had previ-
ously been used at the national level, was thus lifted up to European level.39 
 
In 1998, the European Commission established a communication and consul-
tation procedure vis-à-vis non-EC countries.40 Real concern regarding irreg-
ular migration came with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and this period 
has been identified by scholars as the start of a new securitised analysis of 
migration.41 This new approach was further enabled by the movement of mi-
gration and asylum to the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of Community law 
in the Maastricht Treaty42 in 1992.43 Chou argues that by “providing a legal 
basis for external migration regulation, the [Maastricht Treaty] legitimised 
the ‘securitarian’ approach”.44  
 
However, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) also gained competence to 
rule on matters of asylum and migration, specifically on the interpretation of 
asylum provisions, following references from the Member States’ courts 
through the Amsterdam Treaty.45 However, the legal area is, as expressed by 
Noll, “engulfed in a straight-jacket of intergovernmental decision-making”.46 
This due to the fact that many states continued to regard the area of migration 
control as a matter of state sovereignty.  
 
The introduction of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), has sim-
plified the situation, and the opportunity for accountability increased.47 For 
                                               
38 Chou (2009) p. 546. 
39 Chou (2009) p. 546. 
40 European Commission Decision of July 8 1985 Setting up a Prior Communication and 
Consultation Procedure on Migration Policies in Relation to Non-Member Countries. 
41 Byrne, Noll & Vedsted Hansen (2002) ch. 1. 
42 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, commonly known as the Maas-
tricht Treaty. 
43 O’Nions (2014) p. 74.  
44 Chou (2009) p. 547. 
45 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Article 73. 
46 Noll (2000) p. 594. 
47 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU 30 March 2010 C 83/47 
‘TFEU’; O’Nions (2014) p. 75. 
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example, judicial oversight has been reinforced and the European Parliament 
has been given a key role as regards asylum law-making, as the ordinary leg-
islative procedures was extended to include such asylum matters.48 Further, 
Article 78 TFEU “requires the adoption of a uniform status for individuals 
having been granted international protection, uniform standards on proce-
dures and reception conditions as well as a common system of temporary pro-
tection”.49 Notably, as Article 78 is lex specialis it has paved the way for fur-
ther harmonisation, from minimum standards to common procedures.50 
 
Another major change is the legally binding status of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights51, as the Charter includes both a right to asylum and the pro-
hibition of refoulement, although only applicable to the EU institutions.52 As 
a result of these changes, greater advancements in refugee protection have 
been anticipated, especially as the reduced legislative role of the Council, 
should mean that Member State interests should be balanced with the interests 
of the European Parliament.53  
3.1.1 The Origins of the Common European Asylum System 
The European Council’s Tampere milestones from 1999 include a commit-
ment to the Refugee Convention and international human rights’ standards, 
by acknowledging the right to seek asylum.54 The aspiration of a common 
asylum system thus seems founded on justice, fairness and solidarity. How-
ever, simultaneously to the abovementioned values, the need to control exter-
nal borders in order to prevent illegal immigration is recognised.55  
 
O’Nions states that although it is regrettable that asylum and illegal immigra-
tion are linked together, it is not surprising. She goes on to argue that the 
illegal immigration agenda has prevailed, with asylum interpreted narrowly 
as a matter of immigration control, and a security concern.56 In accordance 
with this view, combating terrorism had become the key task of the common 
policy by 2004, with the introduction of The Hague programme.57 Since, sur-
veillance and inception strategies have been introduced “with the primary aim 
                                               
48 O’Nions (2014) p. 75. 
49 O’Nions (2014) p. 75. 
50 O’Nions (2014) p. 75. 
51 ECHR reference. 
52 Article 18 and Article 19 respectively, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights C 364/1 OJ 18 
December 2000. 
53 O’Nions (2014) p. 75. 
54 European Parliament Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council 15 and 16 Oc-
tober 1999, para 4. 
55 European Parliament Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council 15 and 16 Oc-
tober 1999, para 3. 
56 O’Nions (2014) p. 76. 
57 O’Nions (2014) p. 77. 
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of controlling irregular migration”.58 Furthermore, an external dimension of 
EU migration policy has been developed, resulting in third countries being 
co-opted into migration management.59  
3.2 The Dublin System 
The Dublin System is based on Regulation 604/2003,60 which provides both 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for the assessment of an asylum claim made by a third-country national, or 
stateless person, in one of the EU’s Member States. These criteria do not take 
the wish of the concerned individual(s) into account, but rather focuses on 
factors such as through which Member State the applicant first entered the 
EU, or in which Member State the applicant was prior to the asylum applica-
tion.61 The Dublin System has been referred to as the ‘cornerstone of the 
Common European Asylum System’, and was created in order to prevent asy-
lum seekers from both ‘asylum shopping’, i.e. to apply for international pro-
tection in the most favourable country, and/or applying for asylum in multiple 
Member States.62  
 
Yet, according to data from the European Asylum Support Office (hereinaf-
ter: EASO), the Dublin System does not deliver the results anticipated by the 
Member States. Instead, many asylum seekers chose to disappear into illegal-
ity, rather than be transferred to a Member State in which they do not want to 
live. Despite this, Member States will not discuss an alternative to the status 
quo, and instead focus their efforts on saving the, according to some, failing 
Dublin System.63 
3.3 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: The Charter) regulates 
all the personal, civic, political, economic and social rights enjoyed by people 
within the EU. The Charter is applicable by all institutions and bodies of the 
EU, and to national authorities when they are implementing EU law. For this 
                                               
58 O’Nions (2014) p. 77. 
59 Baldaccini, A ‘The External Dimension of the EU’s Asylum and Immigration policies: 
Old Concerns and New Approaches’ in Baldaccini et al supra n27, 283; O’Nions (2014) p. 
77. 
60Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for interna-
tional protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a state-
less person (recast). 
61 Progin-Theuerkauf & Zoeteweij-Turhan (2017A). 
62 Progin-Theuerkauf & Zoeteweij-Turhan (2017A). 
63 Progin-Theuerkauf & Zoeteweij-Turhan (2017A). 
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particular thesis, Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter are the most relevant, and 
thus will be outlined below. 
3.3.1 Article 4 – Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
The scope of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, as enshrined in Article 4 is defined in Article 51 of the Char-
ter.64 Article 4 addresses the institutions, bodies, offices, agencies of the EU, 
and the Member States, but only when they are implementing EU law.65  
 
The prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
follows from the inviolability of human dignity and enshrines a fundamental 
value of democratic societies.66 The prohibition has therefore received a spe-
cial status under international law, constituting one of the few absolute and 
non-derogable human rights.67  
 
Despite the negative formulation of the prohibition of torture and ill-treat-
ment, this right also creates a corresponding positive obligation. Therefore, 
EU institutions and bodies must take positive measures to comply with the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.68 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Article 19 (2) of the Charter contains an ex-
plicit ‘right of non-refoulement’. The Article states that “[n]o one may be 
removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he 
or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’.  
3.3.2 Article 18 – Right to Asylum 
Article 18 of the Charter states that: 
 
“[t]he right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules 
of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 Jan-
uary 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union”.  
 
                                               
64 Article 4 corresponds to the right guaranteed under Article 3 of the ECHR, by virtue of 
Article 52(3) of the Charter, and thus has the same scope and meaning as the ECHR Article. 
65 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 63. 
66 Soering v. The United Kingdom, para 88. 
67 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 75. 
68 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 89. 
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Initially the right to asylum was grouped together with the prohibition of col-
lective expulsion69, and while this was later revised, it illustrates the interre-
lationship of the two articles.70 
 
The right to asylum is understood as including a series of distinct rights that 
govern the relationship between the individual seeking, or in need of, inter-
national protection and the petitioned states. These distinct rights begin when 
the right of being allowed entry into the state’s territory, and being admitted 
to a status determination procedure, and is concluded with the applicant at-
taining some kind of durable solution.71 It is important to note that while the 
right to asylum is closely linked to the prohibition of refoulement, the institu-
tion of asylum is not limited to non-refoulement.72 
 
States have generally refused to accept an international obligation to grant 
asylum, and while Article 18, and the Charter as a whole, is an attempt to 
codify existing Member States practices, its purpose was not to extend the 
scope of the right to asylum, or to create new rights.73 
 
Article 18 does not include any express limitations, but the right to asylum 
may be subjected to restrictions in accordance with general derogation clause 
of Article 52 (1) of the Charter, which states that all such limitations must be 
based in law and meet the test of proportionality and necessity.74  
3.4 The Common EU Visa Policy 
The EU’s Common Visa Policy is derived from the Schengen acquis, which 
in turn is founded on the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 (Schengen Convention).75 Through the Schengen 
Convention, internal border checks where set aside, and a common policy on 
external border management created. Finally, work towards adopting a com-
mon visa policy had started in earnest.76 
 
When the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU framework in 1999, 
the EU gained exclusive competence in issuing short-stay Schengen visas 
                                               
69 The prohibition of collective expulsion is regulated in Article 19 (1) of the Charter. 
70 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 521. 
71 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 522. 
72 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 522. 
73 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 530. 
74 Peers, Hervey, Kenner & Ward (2014) p. 537. 
75 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Gov-
ernments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders 19 
June 1990, [2000] OJ L 239/19 (as amended). 
76 Chapter 3 of the Schengen Convention. 
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(type C), a visa which allows an individual to transit through the international 
airports of the Member State, or stay for no more than 90 days in any 180-
day period in the EU.77 Furthermore, Article 77 (2) (a) of the TFEU provides 
that the European Parliament and the Council should adopt measures con-
cerning the common policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits. 
 
The Common EU Visa Policy requires nationals of certain non-EU countries 
to be in possession of a Schengen visa when seeking to cross the external 
borders of the Member States, and when travelling to the Schengen area for 
short stays.78 These countries are listed in the Visa List Regulation.79 Annex 
I lists the nationalities that require a visa for short stays in the Schengen Area, 
while Annex II lists those who do not require visas.80  
 
Thus, it is interesting to recognise what considerations have impacted the 
placement of a particular country on either the list in Annex I, or the list in 
Annex II. The preamble provides an indication, stating that “risks relating to 
security and illegal immigration should be given priority consideration”.81 
However, according to Noll, the exact implications of the term ‘risks relating 
to the illegal immigration’, remains undefined. Noll argues that there is “little 
doubt that the number of protection seekers impacts on the assessment of 
‘risks related to illegal immigration’”.82  
 
In order for visa requirements to work as an effective tool, the harmonisation 
of visa regimes is essential. Such harmonisation includes both formal and ma-
terial issues, such as procedural and technical co-operation and agreeing on 
conditions for the issuing of visas.83 Especially in an area without internal 
borders and border controls, such as in most of the EU, divergences in visa 
requirements particularly undermines the efficiency of entry controls.84  
3.4.3 Community Code on Visas (The Visa Code) 
The Community Code on Visas, often referred to as the Visa Code, estab-
lishes the harmonised procedures and conditions for issuing Schengen visas 
for short stays or transits in the Schengen Area.85 The Visa Code, which en-
tered into force in 2010, thus represents a further development in the 
                                               
77 Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 13 July establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), [2009] OJ L 243/1 (as 
amended). 
78 Iben Jensen (2014) p. 10. 
79 [2001] OJ L 81/1 (as amended). Recitals 2-3 and 12 of the Preamble. 
80 Article 1 (1) - (2) of the Visa List Regulation. 
81 Preamble, Visa Regulation, para. 3. 
82 Noll (2000) p. 166. 
83 Noll (2000) p. 162. 
84 Noll (2000) p. 162. 
85 Iben Jensen (2014) p. 10. 
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Schengen acquis, and the objective is to ensure harmonised application of the 
common visa policy.86 Further, the Visa Code interacts with the Visa List 
Regulation, and the Visa Code applies to any third-country national listed in 
Annex I of the Visa List Regulation.87 Visas constitute one of the major pre-
entry measures, that is, measures affecting the possibility of protection seek-
ers to reach the territory of potential host states.88 
 
The Visa Code does not establish a separate procedure for the lodging and 
processing of Limited Territorial Validity Visas (hereinafter: LTVs) applica-
tions on humanitarian grounds or because of international obligations, mean-
ing that possible protection needs, and human rights issues are reviewed in 
the ‘ordinary’ visa application process.89 Further, a visa is for the purpose of 
the Visa Code defined in Article 2 as “an authorisation … [for] entry in the 
territory of the Member States”.  
3.4.4 Visas with Limited Territorial Validity 
LTVs may be issued in exceptional cases, if the concerned Member State 
“considers it necessary” to derogate from the common entry conditions for 
reasons of national interest, on humanitarian grounds or because of its inter-
national obligations.90 Typically, such a visa is only valid on the territory of 
the Member State that issued the visa, although it can in exceptional cases be 
extended to other Member States if they consent to this.91  
 
Thus, if a Member State considers itself to have an international obligation 
vis-à-vis a refugee visa applicant, the Member State shall issue an LTV Visa. 
However, the wording of Article 25 of the Visa Code does not clarify when 
there might be an obligation to issue such visas.92 Additionally, the Visa Code 
states that Member States should have a cautious approach, recommending 
the issuing of LTVs only as an exception. In an Annex to the Visa Code, it is 
instead stated that “[i]t should not be expected that the Schengen [Member 
States] [would] use and abuse the possibility to issue LTVs”.93 
                                               
86 Recitals 3 and 18 of the Preamble, cf. Recital 38. 
87 Iben Jensen (2014) p. 10. 
88 Noll (2000) p. 161. 
89 Iben Jensen (2014) p. i. 
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more Member States but not all Member States’. 
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4 Safe Third Countries and 
Readmission Agreements  
An increasingly discussed topic in the EU is that of safe third countries, and 
the role these countries should or should not play in EU’s migration system. 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the concept of safe third countries 
and readmission agreements. 
4.1 The Concept of Safe Third Countries 
According to Noll, the domestic rules for granting asylum currently vary 
greatly in Western Europe.94 This has primarily two consequences. Firstly, a 
rational protection seeker would not seek protection in any potential host 
country, but rather choose a potential host country with comparatively high 
recognition rates. Second, it is further rational for a rejected asylum seeker to 
file an asylum application in another European country (a concept frequently 
referred to as ‘asylum shopping’).95 
 
European States’ reaction to the varying domestic rules and recognition rates 
was not at first further harmonisation, however, despite this being the primary 
reason for such secondary movements, or ‘asylum shopping’. Instead, “states 
stipulate[d] the fictive equality of [the domestic] systems, and allocated pro-
tection seekers to them under mechanical rule”.96 This allocation of protection 
seekers is based on the concept of safe third countries. The concept is built on 
the idea that when a certain number of formal criteria indicate that a protec-
tion seeker could have sought protection in a third country through which he 
or she passed, then his or her claim should be rejected, and asked return to 
that country.97  
 
The concept of safe third countries has two essential parts. Firstly, that the 
responsibility for the processing of a protection claim must be established by 
allocation criteria. Secondly, that physical readmission of the protection 
seeker to the responsible country must be secured.98 Seeing as states are not 
under obligation to readmit non-nationals according to customary interna-
tional law, this readmission obligation must be created through an interna-
tional treaty.99 
                                               
94 Noll (2000) p. 182. 
95 Noll (2000) p. 182. 
96 Noll (2000) p. 183. 
97 Noll (2000) p. 183. 
98 Noll (2000) p. 184. 
99 Noll (2000) p. 184. 
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By establishing this mechanical transfer of protection seekers, the safe third 
country concept effectively denies protection seekers the freedom to choose 
between potential host countries and removes the states’ obligation to process 
each claim in substance, as the responsibility to do so is transferred to another 
country.100 In practice, a system of safe third countries requires a series of 
preconditions, for example the identity and travel route of the protection 
seeker must be established, and a third country must be willing to take over 
the protection seeker and his or her case.101 Further, it is important that the 
identity of a protection seeker is established in order to prevent multiple ap-
plications.102 
4.2 Readmission Agreements 
Treaties establishing the mechanical transfer of protection seekers, are com-
monly known as readmission agreements.103 The Report on the Implementa-
tion of Readmission Agreements includes a working definition of what is to 
be considered a readmission agreement: 
 
“A readmission agreement shall be understood in general as an inter-
national agreement stipulating the procedures for the return and read-
mission of individuals (with the exception of extradition). The objec-
tive of such an agreement […] is to: 
 
- combat illegal migration (and in this sense to maintain public 
order and political stability in the countries affected by the im-
migration influx)   
 
- share the burden of illegal migration by more countries 
 
- have a preventative influence on the thinking of potential immi-
grants 
 
and thus to meet one of the conditions for the gradual reduction or abo-
lition of the control on the internal borders of the countries which follow 
the readmission principles”.104 
 
As concerns third country nationals, such agreements include a co-operation 
between transit countries and destination countries, since returning a third 
country national to a country other than the country of nationality or of habit-
ual residence requires some form of agreement between at least two states. 
                                               
100 Noll (2000) p. 184. 
101 Noll (2000) p. 184. 
102 Noll (2000) p. 185. 
103 Noll (2000) p. 203. 
104 Working Group of the Budapest Group, Report on the Implementation of Readmission 
Agreements, Doc. No. BG11/96 C, p. 2. 
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Therefore, a readmission agreement is fundamental for a return to a safe third 
country.105 
 
However, such readmission agreements and their increasing use has been crit-
icised, notably by the UNHCR, due to the lack of provisions assuring the ob-
servance of the prohibition of refoulement. Accordingly, the UNHCR has ex-
pressly discouraged the use of “classic bilateral readmission agreements […] 
to return asylum-seekers, even where this is technically possible”.106 
4.2.1 Readmission Agreements in the EU 
In 1994 the Council put together a specimen agreement, covering the read-
mission of national and third country nationals, and recommended its use in 
a non-binding instrument.107 In 1995, this was followed by guiding principles 
for drawing up readmission protocols, and in 1996 the Council took further 
steps to disseminate readmission obligations.108  
 
According to Noll, some of the EU acquis concerning allocation are worrying. 
For instance, states adhere to varying concepts of what constitutes a safe third 
country. This, Noll argues, has previously resulted in making it “virtually im-
possible for the first requesting state to predict where the requested state may 
return a given protection seeker […]”, and thus protection seekers may be 
returned to a country that “would not have been considered safe by the state 
starting the return movement”.109 
 
Further, Noll highlights the risk that communication issues, or miscommuni-
cation, between the requesting and requested state may affect the legal cer-
tainty of the protection seeker’s asylum process. For example, “if not made 
clear to the authorities of the requested state that a returned person made a 
protection claim which has not been decided in substance, the risk prevails 
that such a case will be treated simply as an illegal migrant which can be 
returned to the country of origin”.110 
 
Additionally, allocation to another Member State or a safe third country may 
negatively impact the legal standing of the protection seeker, according to 
                                               
105 Noll (2000) p. 204. 
106 UNHCR Division of International Protection, Note for the Standing Committee of the 
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Noll. Asylum legislations vary considerably, even within the EU, and an al-
location to a Member State with a more restrictive practice may decrease the 
chances of a person receiving protection. Furthermore, removal to a safe third 
country outside the EU may create an even greater protection loss, due to for 
example restrictive recognition practices.111  
 
Finally, Noll argues that allocation mechanisms, such as readmission agree-
ments, risk being manipulated by the protection seekers, and considers it 
“conceivable that some protection seekers prefer continued illegality in the 
destination country to being allocated to a safe third country”. If this happens, 
then the allocation mechanisms have failed to ‘solve the problem’ but have 
rather shifted it somewhere else.112 
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5. Humanitarian Visas 
 
“Statistics from the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) 
show that, during the past 3 years, an average of 10 migrants a day have 
died in the Mediterranean. … When it published these statistics at the 
end of December 2016, the UNHCR called on the EU to organise legal 
migration routes for refugees. … Among the EU institutions, a courte-
ous silence echoed those proposals.”113 
 
The United Nations has repeatedly called for more solidarity and responsibil-
ity-sharing measures, in addition to establishing legal migration alternatives 
in the form of humanitarian visas, PEPs and enhanced family reunification.114 
This chapter will discuss what a humanitarian visa is, what role it plays in the 
EU legal order, and what the future of humanitarian visas might look like. 
5.1 What are Humanitarian Visas? 
Humanitarian visas fall within the category of the so-called Protection Entry 
Procedures (PEPs), which allow a non-national to approach the potential host 
state outside its territory, at its diplomatic representation, with a claim of asy-
lum or other international protection, and to be granted an entry permit in case 
of a positive response to that claim.115 However, humanitarian visas are not 
the only such procedure, and there are other protection practices with the aim 
of meeting individual or collective protection needs outside the territory of a 
Member State, such as humanitarian admission, temporary admission, diplo-
matic asylum and resettlement.116  
 
However, what makes humanitarian visas unique according to some experts 
is the central role given to the individual autonomy of the protection seeker, 
along with the fact that the eligibility assessment procedure can be conducted 
extraterritorially.117 In this way, humanitarian visas are constructed as to pro-
vide safe and legal access to a state’s territory, allowing the final determina-
tion procedure to take place there, a procedure which complements the CEAS, 
instead of substituting it. 
 
                                               
113 Moreno-Lax (2017B). 
114 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Central Mediterranean Sea 
Initiative (CMSI): EU solidarity for rescue-at-sea and protection of refugees and migrants, 
13 May 2014. 
115 Noll (2005) p. 3. 
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5.2 Humanitarian Visas in the EU 
“Migrants who put their lives at risk by crossing the sea in unseaworthy 
boats to reach the shores of southern Europe highlight an alarming and 
unresolved chink in the European Union’s protection of core rights of 
individuals.”118 
 
Currently, a prerequisite for seeking asylum in the EU is that potential asylum 
seekers must be on a Member States’ territory, as EU law does not provide 
for “[…] ways to facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers […]”, and as potential 
asylum seekers are primarily nationals of countries requiring a visa to enter 
the EU and “[…] often do not qualify for an ordinary visa, they may have to 
cross the border in an irregular manner.”119 To put this into perspective, in 
2013 more than 100 nationalities required a visa to enter the EU, covering 
over 80 percent of the global non-EU population.120 
 
Thus, no EU-wide legal routes are available for asylum purposes, making it 
impossible to trigger the protection mechanisms of the CEAS legally.121 This 
has resulted in estimates suggesting that more than 90% of all asylum seekers 
entering Europe do so in an irregular way.122 As a result, the EU has been 
criticised for the strong emphasis placed on security and migration control 
issues, and the relatively small attention that has been paid to the refugee and 
human rights responsibilities of the Member States.123 In light of this, the UN 
has called for increased solidarity and responsibility-sharing measures, as 
well as creating legal migration alternatives through for example humanitar-
ian visas and other PEPs.124 
5.2.1 A Brief History: From the Tampere Conclusions to the 
post-Stockholm Guidelines  
Since the adoption of the Tampere Conclusions125 in 1999, the European 
Commission has encouraged Member States to set up a coordinated approach 
to humanitarian visas, as a part of the Commission’s efforts to ensure an or-
                                               
118 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (2013), Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern 
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derly arrival of persons to the EU. Despite support from the European Parlia-
ment, political will has been lacking in the Member States.126 Additionally, 
the Tampere programme included a partnership with countries of origin, il-
lustrating the growing importance of an ‘external’ dimension of EU migration 
and asylum policy.127 The aim of this common approach was to achieve: 
 
“[…] an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obli-
gations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human 
rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the 
basis of solidarity.”128 
 
The Commission was mandated by the European Council in the Tampere 
Conclusions to examine different ways to create legal access to EU territory 
for third-country nationals seeking protection.129 In the Commission Commu-
nications of November 2000 and November 2001, the Commission empha-
sised the need for a “comprehensive and balanced approach to the common 
immigration policy, ensuring sufficient refugee protection within a system of 
efficient countermeasures against irregular migratory flows.”130 Thus, the 
Commission launched feasibility studies on these themes, in particular re-
garding the processing of asylum requests made outside the EU.131 
 
One of these feasibility studies was carried out by the Danish Centre for Hu-
man Rights in 2002,132 and it outlined and examined practice and the legal 
framework on the use of PEPs in a selection of European states and three non-
European states, as well as the international and European legal framework 
of relevance to protection seekers and PEPs. The study concluded that: 
 
“[l]egal obligations under human rights instruments such as the ECHR 
suggest that states may find themselves obliged to allow access to their 
territories in exceptional situations. Where such access is denied, claim-
ants may rely on the right to a remedy. There are further reasons sup-
porting the conception and operation of formalised Protected Entry Pro-
cedures, which offer a framework for handling such exceptional claims. 
Protected Entry Procedures would be coherent with the acquis as it 
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stands today. Nothing in the present acquis curtails the freedom of in-
dividual Member States to provide for a Protected Entry Procedure at a 
unilateral level. Furthermore, there is a Community competence for de-
veloping a joint normative framework.”133 
 
In light of the above, the study suggested five proposals that could be consid-
ered when developing future PEPs. The proposals included the flexible use 
of the visa regime, a gradual harmonisation through a Directive based on best 
practices, and the introduction of a Schengen Asylum Visa.134 After the fea-
sibility study, the Commission adopted a Communication in March 2003 in 
which the term ‘protected entry scheme’ was explicitly used for the first 
time.135 Further, at the Thessaloniki European Council, the European Council 
noted the Commission Communication, and invited the Commission to “[…] 
explore all parameters in order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in 
the EU of persons in need of international protection […]”.136 
 
Following this, the EU Italian Presidency seminar ‘Towards more orderly and 
managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international protection’, 
which was held in Rome on 13-14 October 2003, where the findings of the 
feasibility study was discussed. Here “[…] it became clear […] that with re-
gard to the potential of Protected Entry Procedures, there is not the same level 
of common perspective and confidence among Member States as exists vis-
à-vis resettlement” and the study was “[…] found too radical and did not get 
political support” among the Member States.137 However, in contrast to this 
the European Parliament welcomed the notion of PEPs, which will be dis-
cussed further below.138  
 
The Commission proceeded to not mentioning PEPs again until June 2008, 
when it reiterated the principle of a comprehensive and balanced migration 
policy, and stated that the CEAS should “ensure access for those in need of 
protection”.139 Further, in the Council of the European Union’s European Pact 
on Immigration and Asylum of September 2008, the Council reaffirmed that 
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“[…] migration and asylum policies must comply with the norms of interna-
tional law, particularly those that concern human rights, human dignity and 
refugees.” 
 
Instead, during the Hague Programme, which covered the period from 2005 
to 2009, work was focused on a balanced approach to migration management, 
including measures to tackle illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking. 
Further, an integrated approach to the management of external borders and 
visa policies was developed, along with the creating of a common asylum 
area.140 
 
Finally, the Stockholm Programme covers the period between 2010 and 2014, 
and states that the EU needs to promote a dynamic and fair immigration pol-
icy. Included in this dynamic and fair approach are partnerships with third 
countries, and the extension of regional protection programmes to assist non-
member states.141 As can be seen from these action plans, the EU now plays 
a serious part in setting the migration and asylum agenda.142  
5.2.2 Humanitarian Visas – The European Parliament’s Take 
In a briefing document from 2016 by the European Parliament’s Policy De-
partment for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, it was stated that the 
European Parliament has “consistently called for the establishment of safe 
and legal avenues to enable protection seekers to reach the European Un-
ion”.143 Furthermore, in its 12 April 2016 resolution on the situation in the 
Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, the Par-
liament argued that “persons seeking international protection should be able 
to apply for a European humanitarian visa directly at any consulate or em-
bassy of the Member States” and that “it is necessary to amend the Union 
Visa Code by including more specific provisions on humanitarian visas”.144 
5.3 Humanitarian Visas in the Visa Code 
In a 2014 paper requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Ulla Iben Jensen concludes, after an 
analysis of the wording of the Visa Code and the application by analogy of 
the recent CJEU judgement in the Koushkaki case,145 that Article 25 (1) 
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obliges Member States to issue LTV visas when this follows from the Mem-
ber States’ refugee and human rights obligations, which would entail a poten-
tial opening for humanitarian visas in the EU.146 However, according to Iben 
Jensen, it still remains unclear whether there is a mandatory assessment of 
protection needs and human rights issues under Articles 19 (4) and 25 (1) of 
the Visa Code, and further whether there is a right of appeal if an LTV visa is 
refused.147  
 
Another difficulty is that the concept of ‘humanitarian grounds’ remains un-
defined in binding EU instruments.148 Noll et al. observed that humanitarian 
grounds “[…] remain undefined in the Schengen Convention [as well as in 
the Schengen Borders Code and the Visa Code], but it is contextually clear 
that the granting of visas to alleviate threats to the applicant’s human rights 
are covered by the term.”149 
 
According to some, Articles 19 and 25 of the Visa Code provide the possibil-
ity of issuing humanitarian visas with limited territorial validity (LTV visas). 
This as Article 19 (4) allows for derogation from the admissibility require-
ments for visa applications, and Article 25 (1) allows derogation from fulfil-
ment of Schengen visa requirements.150  
 
Although there is no automatic link between the two articles, if a Member 
State recognises a humanitarian situation to be serious enough to warrant der-
ogation from the admissibility requirements, it seems logical that the same 
humanitarian situation would be serious enough for the Member State to issue 
an LTV visa.151 Iben Jensen further argued that the scope of the Member 
States’ powers has been extended beyond their physical borders, yet this has 
not been met with an equivalent of their refugee and human rights obligations. 
This, according to Iben Jensen, has the potential of undermining the Member 
States’ obligations, and “render the right to asylum an illusion”.152 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Article 19 (4): Derogations from Admissibility 
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Requirements 
The first obstacle when applying for a Schengen visa, is having one’s appli-
cation declared admissible, something that might prove difficult for protec-
tion seekers, who are often unable to supply the correct documents or lack the 
required funds.153 However, a Schengen visa application that fails to meet the 
admissibility requirements in Article 19, may be considered admissible on 
humanitarian grounds, or for reasons of national interest, pursuant to Article 
19 (4) of the Visa Code.154 Further, according to Article 16 (6) of the Visa 
Code, the visa fee may be waivered or reduced for humanitarian reasons. 
5.3.2 Article 25 (1): Derogations from Schengen Visa 
Requirements  
The Visa List Regulation, mentioned above, does not expressly allow exemp-
tions from the visa requirements in Article 4 for protection seekers. Nonethe-
less, Recital 8 of the Preamble states that a Member State may exempt certain 
categories of persons from visa requirements or impose it on them in accord-
ance with public international law or custom.155 In contrast to this, Article 25 
(1) of the Visa Code provides for the issuance of short-stay visas with limited 
territorial validity on humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest or 
because of international obligations. Further, this corresponds with the three 
exceptional reasons for which a Member State may allow entry into its terri-
tory pursuant to Article 5 (4) (c) of the Schengen Borders Code.156 
5.4 The Koushkaki Case  
The Koushkaki Case concerned an Iranian national whose Schengen visa ap-
plication was refused by German authorities, as there was significant doubt 
whether he would return to Iran before the visa expired.157 After the decision 
was appealed, the Berlin Administrative Court requested the CJEU to clarify 
the conditions for refusal of a Schengen visa. The CJEU ruled that a Schengen 
visa may only be refused on the grounds provided for in the Visa Code.158 It 
is therefore not possible for a national authority to apply any other reasons for 
refusing such a visa, other than those stated in the Visa Code, as this would 
threaten the harmonised system of visa control in the EU. Further, such be-
haviour by some Member States, might result in ‘visa-shopping’, where third-
country nationals apply for visas in the Member States that adhere to the listed 
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grounds.159 Furthermore, the CJEU clarifies that a visa may be refused, in 
accordance with the Visa Code, if there is reasonable doubt regarding the ap-
plicant’s intention to leave the Member States’ territory before the expiry of 
the visa. However, the authority does not have to be certain of the applicant’s 
intention to remain. Relevant factors to consider are the general situation in 
the applicant’s country of residence and the applicant’s individual character-
istics.160 
 
5.4.1 Comments on the Koushkaki Case  
 
As noted by Professor Steve Peers, in his article Do potential asylum-seekers 
have the right to a Schengen visa?, the judgement raises questions concerning 
the grounds of refusal for visa applications made by potential asylum-seekers. 
Noting this, Peers states that applicants for international protection “might 
well apply for a visa with the intention of leaving the country of origin in 
order to apply for asylum in the country which issues the visa”.161 Moreover, 
Peers warns that in order to dispel reasonable doubt as to their intentions to 
return, potential asylum-seekers would need to be dishonest. However, ac-
cording to Peers, “Article 31 of the Geneva Convention implicitly makes it 
clear that the need to flee persecution justifies beaches of immigration 
law”.162 
 
Peers continues to argue that Member States are obliged to issue a visa with 
limited territorial validity, if the Member State considers it necessary on hu-
manitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest or because of international 
obligations. Here, Peers states that “[a]rguably the binding nature of the rele-
vant international obligations, along with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the use of the word ‘shall’, override the discretion suggested by 
the words ‘consider it necessary’”.163 
 
In another blogpost, Professor Steve Peers argues that the Court’s judgement 
is “surely relevant by analogy to applications for most of the various forms of 
short-stay visas referred to in the visa code”.164 The key question in the judge-
ment, that is, the ‘right’ to a Schengen visa, Peers considers the Court’s ruling 
both welcome and convincing, and notes that the Court does not set out the 
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‘right to a visa’, but rather focuses on the exhaustive nature of the list of the 
grounds for refusal of a visa.165 Commenting this, he states that: 
 
“ … this is a distinction without a difference: national authorities must 
nonetheless issue the visa if the conditions are satisfied. As Mary Pop-
pins might say, the different wording is simply a ‘spoonful of sugar’ to 
help the national authorities accept the Court’s ruling.”166 
 
However, as the CJEU stresses, national authorities retain significant discre-
tion in the application of the criteria in the Visa Code. Despite this, Peers 
considers that “the Koushkaki judgement has opened a significant crack in the 
wall of ‘Fortress Europe’ for would-be asylum-seekers”.167 
5.5 The Future of Humanitarian Visas in the EU 
“…until the [EU] has created effective legal pathways to Europe, as it 
has obliged itself to do, people in need of international protection will 
continue to use other ways to save themselves and their loved ones – 
whether the Member States like it or not.”168 
5.5.1 Humanitarian Visas in the EU Member States 
In 2017, according to the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citi-
zens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, there were 16 EU Member States that 
had, or previously had, some form of scheme concerning humanitarian visas. 
However, the same research revealed that in times of crisis the number of 
visas with limited territorial validity issued for humanitarian reasons de-
creased significantly.169  
 
5.5.2 Some National Examples 
 
One such EU Member State with a scheme concerning humanitarian visas is 
France. French authorities issue asylum visas to individuals who are in need 
of international protection, after they have lodged requests with French con-
sulates in their country of residence. This request is then pre-assessed in an 
interview at the consulate, based on the criteria in the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion and taking into account both the applicant’s vulnerability as well as their 
risk of being subjected to refoulement. Further, the individual’s personal con-
nections with France, as well as their integration prospects are assessed. If 
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granted an asylum visa, this allows the individual to stay in France for a pe-
riod of six months, in order to lodge a formal asylum request with the com-
petent authorities.170 
 
Likewise, Germany has implemented humanitarian admission programmes 
sporadically since 1956, and regularly since the 1990s. One of the best known 
contemporary examples is HAP Syria (Humanitarian Admission Programme 
Syria), which has allowed approximately 20 000 Syrians to enter Germany 
directly from Syria’s neighbouring countries, or from Egypt and Libya, from 
2013 to 2015. Such visas are usually of a temporary nature, assuming resi-
dence will not be permanent, and their purpose is to offer protection during a 
period in which the country of origin is undergoing a crisis, war, or other 
dangerous condition. Thus, a residence permit is issued for two years, with 
the option of renewal.171 In addition to similar programmes, German law pro-
vides for an individual foreigner to be granted a residence permit for the pur-
pose of being admitted from abroad in accordance with international law or 
urgent humanitarian grounds.172 
 
In a similar vein, the Irish Government developed a Syrian Humanitarian Ad-
mission Programme (abbreviated SHAP) in 2014, in order to allow natural-
ised Irish citizens of Syrian birth or nationality already lawfully residing in 
Ireland, to make applications for vulnerable close family members to join 
them in Ireland on a temporary basis of up to two years. Persons admitted 
under this programme are entitled to work, and have the opportunity of estab-
lishing a business or investing.173 
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6. CJEU Case C-638/16 X and X                
In December 2016, a Belgian court referred questions to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the issuance of humanitarian vi-
sas to a Christian Syrian family. The central question in the case is whether 
international treaties and Union law oblige EU Member States to allow their 
consulates and embassies to issue humanitarian visas.  
 
This chapter will attempt to outline the case in its entirety, both the reason-
ing of the referring court, the Advocate General and the CJEU.  
6.1 The national process and background 
On 12 October 2016, a Syrian couple, and their three minor children, submit-
ted applications for visas with limited territorial validity, on the basis of Ar-
ticle 25 (1) (a) of the EU Visa Code, at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, before 
returning to Syria the following day.174 The family, living in Aleppo, stated 
that the purpose of the applications was to attain visas on the basis of the EU 
Visa Code175, with limited territorial validity, in order to leave their besieged 
hometown, and apply for asylum in Belgium.176 
 
Further, one of the applicants stated that he had been abducted by an armed 
terrorist group in Syria, who he claimed had beaten and tortured him, and only 
released him following a paid ransom. As Orthodox Christians, the applicants 
emphasise their risk of religious persecution, as well as the generally deterio-
rating security situation in both Syria at large, and Aleppo specifically.177 
 
On 18 October 2016, the Office des Étrangers (Immigration Office, Belgium) 
rejected the applications, stating that the application must be considered con-
trary to the EU Visa Code. This as the family, by seeking to obtain a visa with 
limited territorial validity, in order to apply for asylum in Belgium, clearly 
wished to stay longer than 90 days in Belgium. It was this aim, i.e. to stay in 
Belgium for longer than 90 days, which the Office considered contrary to the 
EU Visa Code. Additionally, the Office states that authorising entry visas, in 
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order to allow the Syrian family to apply for asylum Belgium, would amount 
to allowing them to make an asylum application at a diplomatic post.178 
 
The Syrian family proceeded to challenge the Office’s decision before the 
Conseil du contentieux des étrangers, and submitted that the Charter and 
ECHR, impose a positive obligation on Member States to guarantee the right 
to asylum.179 Further, they claimed that it is only through international pro-
tection that it can be guaranteed that they will not be subjected to torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Belgian State, on the 
other hand, is of the opinion that it is under no obligation to admit a third-
country national into its territory, and that its only obligation in that regard is 
to refrain from deportation.180 
6.2 The Opinion of the referring court 
The CCE referred the case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, 
concerning the interpretation of Article 25(1)(a) of the EU Visa Code, and of 
Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter.181 The referring Court argues that it is appar-
ent from Article 1 of the ECHR that applicants may rely on Article 3 of the 
ECHR only if they are within a Member States ‘jurisdiction’. The referring 
court thus wonder whether the implementation of the visa policy can be con-
sidered as the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.  
 
Further, the referring court also asks whether a right of entry follows from 
either the obligation to take preventative action, or from the principle of non-
refoulement, from Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva Con-
vention.182 Additionally, the referring court points out that unlike Article 3 of 
the ECHR, Article 4 of the Charter, does not depend on the exercise of juris-
diction, but instead on the applicability of EU law, and that it does not follow 
from either the Treaties or from the Charter that that implementation is terri-
torially limited.183 Finally, the Belgian court notes that a Member State must 
issue a visa when it considers it to be necessary due to international obliga-
tions, according to Article 25 in the Visa Code, but considers the extent of the 
Member States’ discretion unclear.184  
 
Based on the abovementioned, the referring court decided to stay the proceed-
ings and refer two questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
                                               
178 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 21. 
179 Art. 3 of the ECHR and Art. 4 of the Charter.   
180 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 24. 
181 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 23.  
182 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 25. 
183 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 26. 
184 CJEU Case C-638/16, PPU, X and X, para 27. 
40 
 
The first question concerns the ‘international obligations’ referred to in Arti-
cle 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, and whether this includes all of the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter, particularly those guaranteed by Articles 4 and 18. 
In line with this, the referring court asks whether these ‘international obliga-
tions’ include obligations that bind the Member States, in the light of the 
ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.185 
 
The second referred question is dependent on the answer to the first question, 
and here the referring court asks the Court of Justice to consider if Article 25 
(1) (a) of the Visa Code should be interpreted as meaning that, subject to dis-
cretion regarding the circumstances of the case, a Member State is required 
to issue a visa with limited territorial validity, if there is a risk of infringement 
of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the Charter or another international obligation 
which binds that Members State. Further, the referring court asks whether the 
existence of links between the applicant and the Member State (through for 
example family connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors), affect 
the answer to the first part of the second question.186 
6.3 The Court of Justice: Jurisdiction 
One of the key questions in the case is whether or not the Court of Justice has 
jurisdiction to answer the referred questions from the Belgian Court. In the 
section below, the issue of jurisdiction is illustrated, from the perspective of 
the parties, the Commission, the Advocate General, and the CJEU in turn.  
6.3.1 The Parties’ View 
The Belgian Government submits that the Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction, 
as the applicant’s situation falls outside the scope of EU law.187 This, the gov-
ernment argues, is due to the fact that the Visa Code only governs stays no 
longer than three months in any six-month period (‘short-stay visas’), and as 
the applicants do not fulfil the conditions required for a short-stay visa ac-
cording to the Visa Code, their situation is not governed by EU law.188 This 
view was subscribed to by most Member State governments participating in 
the hearings.189 
 
Secondly, the Belgian Government states that neither the provisions relating 
to asylum, nor the provisions of the Charter, make it possible to link the ap-
plicant’s situation with EU law. This as, according to Article 3 (1) and (2) of 
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Directive 2013/32, the Common European Asylum System applies only to 
asylum applications made in the territory, or at the borders, of Member States, 
thus excluding requests submitted at Member States’ representations.190 As 
EU law is not implemented concerning situations such as the one in the main 
proceedings, the Belgian Government is of the opinion that the Charter cannot 
be applicable. Finally, the Belgian Government argues that, as there is no EU 
legislative act covering the conditions for entry and stay for a three-month 
period for third country nationals on humanitarian grounds, the Member 
States have maintained their jurisdiction in the matter.191 
6.3.2 The Commission’s View  
The Commission puts forward similar arguments to those of the Belgian Gov-
ernment, except for the government’s argument regarding the Court of Justice 
not having jurisdiction. According to the Commission’s interpretation, “a visa 
application for the purpose of reaching the territory of a Member State in or-
der to seek international protection there cannot be understood as an applica-
tion for a short-stay visa” but should be dealt with as an application for a long-
stay visa under national law.192  
6.3.3 Advocate General Mengozzi’s View 
The Advocate General begins by stating that all of the abovementioned ob-
jections should be rejected.193  The Advocate General states that it is obvious 
from the main proceedings, that the applicants sought, under the Visa Code, 
the issuing of a short-stay visa with limited territorial validity. Likewise, it is 
apparent that the competent authorities classified, examined and processed 
the applications as applications for visas under the Visa Code, and the appli-
cations were deemed admissible under the Visa Code.194 
 
Further, the Advocate General states that the intention of the applicants to 
apply for refugee status once they had entered Belgian territory, “cannot alter 
the nature or purpose of their applications” (Advocate General Mengozzi’s 
italics). In particular, the Advocate General argues that the “intention cannot 
convert the visa applications into applications for long-stay visas or place 
those applications outside the scope of the Visa Code and of EU law”, despite 
the submissions of several Member States at the hearing before the Court.195 
In line with this, depending on the interpretation of Article 25 of the Visa 
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Code, and in particular its relationship with Article 32, the applicants’ inten-
tions could at most constitute a ground for refusal, but can never constitute a 
ground for not applying the Visa Code.196  
 
Further, the Advocate General notes that the applicants did not need to apply 
for long-stay visas, as, if they had been allowed to enter Belgian territory, 
their right to remain in Belgian territory beyond the 90 days would have 
stemmed from their status of asylum seekers, in accordance with Article 9 (1) 
of Directive 2013/32.197 
6.3.4 The CJEU’s View  
The Belgian Government, as outlined above, disputed the Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction to answer the referred questions, on the grounds that Article 25(1) 
of the Visa Code, does not apply to the applications at issue in the main pro-
ceedings.198 However, the Court deemed that it in fact had jurisdiction over 
the present case, as it is “plain from the order of reference that the applications 
at issue were submitted on humanitarian grounds on the basis of Article 25 of 
the Visa Code”.199 Concerning the question of whether the Visa Code itself is 
applicable to such applications as those in the main proceedings, the Court 
stated that the answer “is inextricably linked to the answers to be given to the 
present request for preliminary ruling”, and in those circumstances, the Court 
has jurisdiction over the request for preliminary ruling.200 
6.4 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi 
Advocate General Mengozzi starts by stating that the case provides the Court 
with an opportunity to clarify the legal requirements for Member States when 
adopting a decision regarding an application for a visa with limited territorial 
validity, and thus, their responsibility to respect the rights guaranteed by the 
Charter.201 Advocate General Mengozzi argues that in the referred case, the 
Court must come to the conclusion that the respect for those rights, particu-
larly Article 4 of the Charter, implies a positive obligation for the Member 
States. This positive obligation requires them to issue visas with limited ter-
ritorial validity, if there are substantial grounds to believe that refusal will 
expose the applicant to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.202 
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Further, as opposed to that argued by various governments at the Court’s 
hearing, Advocate General Mengozzi is convinced that there is no need to 
wait for a hypothetical modification of the Visa Code, “in order to recognise 
a legal access route to the right to international protection”.203 Instead, he is 
of the opinion that such a legal route already exists, specifically through Ar-
ticle 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code204, as has also been acknowledged by the 
rapporteur of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.205 
6.4.1 The first question referred for a preliminary ruling 
The first of the referring court’s two questions, consists of two parts. The first 
one concerns the meaning of ‘international obligations’ in Article 25 (1) (a) 
of the Visa Code, and whether it covers the rights guaranteed by the Charter, 
while the second part asks whether the expression covers obligations in the 
ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.206  
 
Advocate General Mengozzi starts by confidently stating that “there is not 
much doubt in my mind as to the reply to be given to the first part of the 
question”207, and points out that the EU has its own legal order, separate from 
that of international law. According to Article 6 (1) TEU, the Charter is part 
of EU primary law, and is, as such, a source of EU law. Thus, the Member 
States must comply with the Charter by reason of their accession to the EU, 
and therefore the requirements in the Charter are not among the ‘international 
obligations’ mentioned in Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, regardless of 
the meaning given to that expression.208 This, however, the Advocate General 
stresses, does not mean that decisions taken by Member States on the basis of 
Article 25 “are not required to be taken in compliance with the requirements 
of the Charter”.209 
 
The scope of the Charter, in terms of Member State action, is defined in Ar-
ticle 51 (1), and according to this, the fundamental rights of the Charter must 
be respected and guaranteed where national legislation, and the actions of the 
Member State, fall within the scope of EU law.210 Therefore, it is necessary 
to ascertain whether a Member State, in situations such as the one in the main 
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proceedings, implements EU law for the purposes of Article 51 (1) of the 
Charter.211 
 
In order to ascertain this, Advocate General Mengozzi points out that the con-
ditions and rules for issuing visas of limited territoriality are laid down in an 
EU regulation. Further, the purpose of that EU regulation is “to contribute to 
the development … of a common visa policy aimed at ‘facilitating legitimate 
travel and tackling illegal immigration through further harmonisation of na-
tional legislation and handling practices at local consular missions’”.212  
 
The Advocate General argues that, by issuing, or refusing to issue, a visa with 
limited territorial validity, the Member States’ authorities adopt a decision 
concerning the crossing of the Member States’ external borders, “which is 
subject to a harmonised set of rules and act, therefore, in the framework of 
and pursuant to EU law” (AGs italics).213 The fact that such a decision is 
regulated by EU law is not affected by the discretion awarded Member States 
concerning the application of Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code.214 Thus, 
according to Advocate General Mengozzi, when adopting a decision under 
Article 25 the Member States’ authorities are implementing EU law in ac-
cordance with the requirements in Article 51 (1) of the Charter, which re-
quires the authorities to respect the rights guaranteed by the Charter.215 
 
This conclusion is in part based on the wording of the Visa Code itself, with 
recital 29 stating that the code is subject to the fundamental rights and the 
principles of the Charter. Further, the Commission, in the foreword to its 
Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of is-
sued visas, states that fundamental rights must be respected, emphasising that 
those rights must be guaranteed to any person applying for a visa.216 
 
As argued by Advocate General Mengozzi in the abovementioned section 
concerning the Court’s jurisdiction, the Visa Code was the basis for the ap-
plication, and decision, by the Belgian authorities.217 Thus, the decision in the 
main proceedings is an implementation of the Visa Code, and thus, EU law, 
as regards Article 51 (1) of the Charter. So, while implementing and adopting 
those decisions, the Belgian authorities were required to respect and uphold 
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the rights guaranteed by the Charter.218 Furthermore, Advocate General Men-
gozzi notes that the fundamental rights recognised in the Charter are guaran-
teed to the addressees of adopted acts, irrespective of any territorial crite-
rion.219  
 
Finally, the Advocate General states that if the Charter, and its guaranteed 
rights, are deemed to be inapplicable when an institution or a Member State 
implementing EU law acts extraterritorially, then such a decision would have 
consequences beyond the realm of visa policy.220 But, if focusing on the visa 
policy area in particular, such a decision would have significant conse-
quences, with Advocate General Mengozzi arguing that if Charter application 
was made conditional on both territorial connection with the EU, as well as a 
connection with EU law, then the vast majority, if not the whole, of the Visa 
Code would become exempt from the requirement of respecting the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter.221 
 
The second part of the first referred question, concerns the expression ‘inter-
national obligations’ in Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, and whether this 
expression covers the obligations that bind Member States in light of the 
ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.222 Here, the Advocate Gen-
eral is of the opinion that the Court adopting a position on this question, would 
prove not useful in the main proceedings, as, regardless of the meaning and 
scope of this particular expression, it is indisputable that both the ECHR and 
the Geneva Convention are important for both the interpretation and action 
concerning EU law in this area.223 
 
Addressing the concerns expressed by the referring court regarding the ap-
plicability of the ECHR and the Geneva Convention, as the situation in the 
main proceedings does not satisfy the territorial criterion preconditioning 
their applicability, Advocate General Mengozzi states that there is no need 
for the Court to adjudicate this.224 This as the Belgian authorities were re-
quired to comply with the provisions of the Charter, more specifically, Arti-
cles 4 and 18 thereof, when adopting the decisions contested in the main pro-
ceedings.225 Hence, as Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter guarantee protection 
which is, at the very least, equivalent to that provided by Article 3 of the 
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ECHR and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, any further dwelling on the 
potential applicability of those conventions is unnecessary.226 
 
6.4.1.1 Summary: The Advocate General’s answer to the first 
referred question 
 
To summarise, the Advocate General’s answer to the first referred question 
is that the expression ‘international obligations’ in Article 25 (1) (a) of the 
Visa Code does not include the Charter. However, the Member States must 
comply with the Charter when examining, on the basis of Article 25, a visa 
application in support of which humanitarian grounds are invoked, and when 
adopting a decision in relation to such an application.227 
6.4.2 The second question referred for a preliminary ruling 
In its second question, the referring court asks whether, in a situation where 
there is a genuine risk of infringement of Article 4 and/or Article 18 of the 
Charter, a Member State is required to issue a humanitarian visa, in accord-
ance with Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code. This, despite the degree of dis-
cretion allowed each Member State when assessing the circumstances of in-
dividual cases. Furthermore, the referring court asks whether potential links 
between the applicant and the Member State is significant, for example family 
connections, host families, guarantors and sponsors.228 
 
According to Advocate General Mengozzi, the answer to the first part of the 
question must be affirmative, irrespective of the existence of potential links 
between the applicant and the Member State concerned.229 The Advocate 
General claims that, just as conceded by the Belgian government, the wording 
of Article 32 (1) of the Visa Code makes it clear that this provision applies 
‘without prejudice’ to Article 25 (1) of the Visa Code. Thus, the grounds for 
refusing a visa, as stated in Article 32 (1), do not preclude a Member State 
from applying Article 25 (1) of the Visa Code.230 Thus, Article 25 (1) enables 
Member States, to preclude the grounds for refusal listed in Article 32 on 
humanitarian grounds.231 
 
Furthermore, the Advocate General is of the opinion that not only does EU 
law empower Member States to issue such humanitarian visas,232 but it also 
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requires Member States to examine the humanitarian grounds invoked by a 
third-country national.233 If, after such an examination, the Member State 
considers the humanitarian grounds to be well-founded, the Visa Code re-
quires that Member State to issue a visa with limited territorial validity.234 
 
However, the Member States maintain a discretion concerning which human-
itarian grounds that make it necessary to preclude the application of the 
grounds for refusal in Article 32 (1) of the Visa Code, in the light of the word-
ing of Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code.235 Yet, this maintained discretion, 
is circumscribed by EU law.236 Furthermore, the expression itself, that is ‘hu-
manitarian grounds’, is a EU law concept, as Article 25 contains no references 
to the national law of the Member States.237  
 
Advocate General Mengozzi argues that the situation of the applicants in the 
main proceedings must, ‘without a shadow of a doubt’, fall within the scope 
of the humanitarian grounds in Article 25 of the Visa Code, and continued to 
state that if this was not the case, then the “expression would be rendered 
meaningless”.238  
 
Further, the Advocate General points out that when a Member State decides 
to refuse to issue a visa with limited territorial validity, on the grounds that 
the humanitarian grounds stated by the applicant do not preclude the grounds 
for refusal listed in Article 32 (1) of the Visa Code, then the Member State is 
implementing EU law, and thus, must respect the rights guaranteed by the 
Charter.239 The limit of Member States’ discretion, then, is when the relevant 
authorities reach the conclusion that by refusing to grant the application of 
Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, despite the humanitarian grounds stated, 
the Member State does not thereby infringe the rights in the Charter. If the 
opposite conclusion is reached, it must preclude the grounds for refusal in 
Article 32 (1) and issue a visa with limited territorial validity.240 
 
By analogy of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 
3 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the Charter imposes not only a negative obliga-
tion, that is, prohibiting Member States from using torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, but also a positive obligation. This positive obligation 
requires Member States to take action in order to ensure that individuals are 
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not subjected to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, particularly in 
case of vulnerable individuals. Moreover, this obligation to take action ex-
tends even to when such ill-treatment is administered by private individu-
als.241 The Court, in its judgment N.S. and Others242 and Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru243, held that, just as Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the Charter, 
under certain circumstances, imposes a positive obligation on the Member 
States.244 
 
Thus, Advocate General Mengozzi stated that, “in adopting the contested de-
cisions, the Belgian State knew or ought to have known that the foreseeable 
consequences of that decision” left the applicants with an awful dilemma; ei-
ther staying in Aleppo, and continuing to expose themselves to danger, suf-
fering and inhuman treatment, or submit themselves to equivalent treatment, 
by trying to reach the Member States’ territory without a visa.245 This as the 
decisions by the Belgian State would “directly encourage the applicants in the 
main proceedings, unless they stayed in Syria, to have to expose themselves, 
in desperation, to physical pain, risking their lives in doing so, in order to 
exercise the right to international protection to which they lay claim”.246 The 
Advocate General believes that there is no doubt that such treatment as men-
tioned above, is prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter247, and that a Member 
State should, in accordance with its positive obligation, take measures, within 
its powers, as to avoid third-country nationals seeking international protection 
having to take such risks.248  
 
Rejecting the argument that the applicants in the main proceedings could have 
found refuge in Lebanon,249 the Advocate General states that the registration 
of new Syrian refugees was suspended by the Lebanese Government at the 
time of the contested decision, meaning that unregistered refugees risked be-
ing arrested and detained for illegally residing in Lebanon.250 In fact, some 
human rights observers have stated that in 2016, the situation for Syrian ref-
ugees in the host countries surrounding Syria were so precarious that many 
Syrian refugees chose to return to Syria, risking their lives. The situation for 
Christians proved to be especially difficult, with representatives of intergov-
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ernmental organisations and NGOs expressing fears of ostracism, intimida-
tion and serious violence of the religious minority in Syria’s neighbouring 
countries, even in refugee camps.251 
 
The Advocate General is thus, based on the abovementioned, convinced that 
at the time of the adopted contested decisions, the Belgian State should have 
reached the conclusion that, by refusing to issue visas with limited territorial 
validity on humanitarian grounds, and by instead applying the grounds for 
refusal in Article 32 (1) of the Visa Code, there were substantial grounds to 
believe that this would expose the applicants to a genuine risk of suffering 
treatment prohibited by Article 4 of the Charter.252 Additionally, Advocate 
General Mengozzi argues that “[i]t cannot be denied, in the light of the infor-
mation … in the main proceedings, that the applicants … would have ob-
tained the international protection … if they had succeeded in overcoming the 
obstacles of an illegal journey”.253  
 
Moreover, due to the absolute nature of the right in Article 4 of the Charter, 
Advocate General Mengozzi considers that the absence of family links, or 
links of any other nature, to the Member State, is a factor which should not 
affect the answer to the second referred question.254 Regarding Article 18 of 
the Charter, the Advocate General does not rule out that the decision in the 
main proceedings also infringes the applicants’ right to asylum, but does not, 
however, find it necessary to adjudicate this part of the referred question.255 
 
6.4.2.1 Summary: The Advocate General’s answer to the second 
referred question 
 
As summarised by the Advocate General himself, Mengozzi proposes that: 
 
“the Court answer the second question submitted by the referring court 
as follows: Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code must be interpreted as 
meaning that, in the light of the circumstances of the main proceedings, 
the Member State applied to by a third-country national in order to issue 
that national a visa with limited territorial validity on humanitarian 
grounds is required to issue such a visa if there are substantial grounds 
to believe that the refusal to issue that document will have the direct 
consequence of exposing that national to treatment prohibited by Arti-
cle 4 of the Charter, by depriving that national of a legal route to exer-
cise his right to seek international protection in that Member State.”256 
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6.4.3 Concluding remarks concerning the Advocate General’s 
reasoning 
While acknowledging that the EU is going through a difficult period, the Ad-
vocate General argues that the “refusal to recognise a legal access route to the 
right to international protection on the territory of Member States – which 
unfortunately often forces nationals of third countries seeking such protection 
to join, risking their lives in doing so, the current flow of illegal immigrants 
to EU’s borders – which seems to be to be particularly worrying, in the light, 
inter alia, of the humanitarian values and respect on which European con-
struction is founded”.257 Therefore, Advocate General Mengozzi considers 
that both the EU’s credibility, and that of its Member States, is at stake.258 
 
Advocate General Mengozzi also stresses the fact that in all of the case-law 
from the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 3 of the ECHR, 
the judgements are always made ex post, often after the treatment in question 
had proven fatal to the victim.259 In the present case, however, the Advocate 
General sees another way forward, stating that “all hope for the applicants in 
the main proceedings has not, thus far, been lost”, and that there is a human-
itarian path, within the present EU law framework, requiring Member State 
to prevent infringements of the absolute rights of persons seeking interna-
tional protection.260  
6.5 Court of Justice 
After the Fifth Chamber of the Court decided, on 15 December 2016, to allow 
the case to be tried under the urgent ruling preliminary ruling procedure pro-
vided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, it also re-
quested that the Court assign the case to the Grand Chamber.261 Below is a 
summary of the answers by the Grand Chamber to the referred questions.  
6.5.1 Consideration of the questions referred 
First, the Court of Justice points out that the fact that the question of a refer-
ring court only includes certain provisions of EU law, does not inhibit the 
Court of Justice from providing the national court “with all the guidance on 
points of interpretation that may be of assistance in adjudicating … whether 
or not that court has referred to those points in its questions”.262 Instead, it is 
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up to the Court of Justice to extract, based on the information provided by the 
referring court, the points of EU law which require interpretation.263 
 
The Visa Code was adopted on the basis of Article 62 of the EC Treaty, under 
which the Council of the European Union may adopt measures concerning 
visas for stays no longer than three months, including the procedures and con-
ditions for issuing these visas by the Member States.264 The purpose of the 
Visa Code is set out in its first article, which states that the objective is to 
establish procedures and conditions for issuing visas for transit through, or 
intended stays on, the territory of the Member States not exceeding 90 days 
in any 180-day period.265  
 
Article 2 of the Visa Code defines the meaning of ‘visa’, in the context of the 
Code, as “an authorisation issued by a Member State with a view, respec-
tively, to transit through or an intended stay on the territory of the Member 
States for a duration of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period and to 
transit through the international transit areas of airports of the Member 
States”.266  
 
The Court continues by stating that it considers it apparent, based on the order 
of reference and material before the Court, that the applicants submitted ap-
plications for visas on humanitarian grounds, based on Article 25 of the Visa 
Code. The purpose of these applications, made at the Belgian embassy in Leb-
anon, was to apply for asylum in Belgium directly after their arrival, with the 
aim of “being granted a residence permit with a period of validity not limited 
to 90 days”.267  
 
On the basis of Article 1, the Court of Justice thus considers such applications 
to fall outside the scope of the Visa Code.268 Furthermore, the Court points 
out that no measure has, to date, been adopted on the basis of Article 79 (2) 
(a) TFEU,269 regarding the conditions concerning issuing of long-term visas 
or residence permits to third-country nationals on humanitarian grounds, and 
thus the applications in the referred case “fall solely within the scope of na-
tional law”.270 
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Accordingly, as the referred situation is not governed by EU law, the Court 
states that the provisions of the Charter, in particular Articles 4 and 18, are 
not applicable.271 In the opinion of the Court of Justice, the crucial circum-
stance is that the purpose of the application in the referred case, differs from 
that of a short-term visa.272 The Court further states that this conclusion is not 
affected by the reasonable doubt regulated in Article 32 (1) (b) of the Visa 
Code, concerning the “applicant’s intention to leave the territory of the Mem-
ber States before the expiry of the visa applied for”, as this is a ground for 
refusal of a visa, not a reason to not apply the code.273 
 
The Court of Justice stresses that deciding otherwise, “would be tantamount 
to allowing third-country nationals to lodge applications for visas on the basis 
of the Visa Code in order to obtain international protection in the Member 
State of their choice, which would undermine the general structure of the sys-
tem established by Regulation No 604/2013", more commonly known as the 
Dublin system.274  
 
Furthermore, the Court comments that deciding otherwise, would also have 
the effect of requiring Member States to allow third-country nationals to sub-
mit applications for international protection to the Member States’ represen-
tations within the territory of third countries, on the basis of the Visa Code.275 
Measures adopted by the EU on the basis of Article 78 TFEU, concerning the 
procedures for applications for international protection, does not impose such 
an obligation, but instead explicitly excludes applications made to Member 
States’ representations from its scope.276 
 
Further, the Court of Justice argues, that it is apparent from Article 3 (1) and 
(2) of Directive 2013/32 that the Directive applies to applications for interna-
tional protection made in the territory of the Member States, but not “to re-
quests for diplomatic or territorial asylum submitted to the representations of 
Member States”.277 Additionally, Articles 1 and 3 of Regulation No. 
604/2013 state that Member States are obliged to examine applications for 
international protection made on a Member States’ territory, and that the pro-
cedures in the Regulation apply exclusively to such applications for interna-
tional protection.278 
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In conclusion, the Court of Justice states that: 
 
“the answer to the questions referred is that Article 1  of the Visa Code 
must be interpreted as meaning that an application for a visa with lim-
ited territorial validity made on humanitarian grounds by a third-coun-
try national, on the basis of Article 25 of the code, to the representation 
of the Member State of destination that is within the territory of a third 
country, with a view to lodging, immediately upon his or her arrival in 
that Member State, an application for international protection and, 
thereafter, to staying in that Member State for more than 90 days in a 
180-day period, does not fall within the scope of that code but, as Eu-
ropean Union law currently stands, solely within that of national 
law”.279  
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7. Discussion  
The abovementioned case, and in particular the difference in reasoning be-
tween the Advocate General and the Court, has resulted in both criticism and 
commentary. Why did the Advocate General and the Court, respectively, rea-
son as they did? This chapter includes both commentary from other migration 
lawyers, but also my own highlights of said differences in reasoning. 
7.1 Differences and similarities between the Court’s 
and the Advocate General’s reasoning 
Before continuing to analyse the judgement and opinion in X and X, as well 
as attempting to understand its potential implications on the EU asylum sys-
tem, as well as the future of humanitarian visas in the EU, I will below briefly 
summarise the key arguments from both the Advocate General and the Court. 
7.1.1 What did the Court of Justice argue? 
In its judgement, the CJEU states that it is apparent that the applicants sub-
mitted applications for visas on humanitarian grounds on the basis of Article 
25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, and that they planned to apply for asylum in 
Belgium upon arrival. Thus, the Court considers the applicants’ aim was to 
be granted residence permits not limited to 90 days. Therefore, on the basis 
of Article 1 of the Visa Code, their application fall outside the scope of the 
Visa Code according to the Court.280 
 
Furthermore, the Court argues that as there have been no measures taken on 
the basis of Article 78 (2) (a) TFEU concerning the issuing of long-term visas 
or residence permits to third-country nationals on humanitarian grounds, the 
situation in the referred case falls solely within the scope of national law. 
Following this, as the referred situation is not governed by EU law, the Char-
ter provisions, in particular Article 4 and 18, are not applicable. The crucial 
circumstance, according to the CJEU, is that the purpose of the application in 
the referred case differs from that of a short-term visa. This conclusion is fur-
ther not affected by the grounds for preclusion in Article 32 (1) (b), as this is 
a ground for refusing a visa, not a reason not to apply the Visa Code in its 
entirety.  
 
Importantly, the CJEU mentions that deciding differently would be “tanta-
mount to allowing third-country nationals to lodge applications for visas on 
the basis of the Visa Code in order to obtain international protection in the 
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Member State of their choice”, which would, according to the Court, under-
mine the current Dublin System.  
 
Furthermore, a different conclusion than the one reached by the Court would 
force Member States to allow third-country nationals to submit applications 
for international protection at the Member States’ representations in third 
countries, on the basis of the Visa Code. Here, the Court notes, measures 
adopted on the basis of Article 78 TFEU explicitly excludes such applica-
tions.281 
7.1.2 What did the Advocate General argue? 
The Court’s stance is not shared by Advocate General Mengozzi, who 
reached an opposite conclusion, arguing that by issuing or refusing to issue 
an LTV visa, Member States adopt a decision concerning the crossing of the 
Member States’ external border, “which is subject to a harmonised set of rules 
and act, therefore, in the framework of and pursuant to EU law”. In line with 
this, the situation in the referred case is, according to Advocate General Men-
gozzi, covered by the Visa Code, and thereby a situation where the Member 
State in question must respect Charter rights.282 
 
While some Member States at the Court hearing argued that it is necessary to 
wait for a modification of the Visa Code before humanitarian visas are a plau-
sible option, this line of argument is rejected by Advocate General Mengozzi. 
Instead, the Advocate General believes that such a legal route already exists 
through Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code, in interplay with Article 32, and 
thus there is no need to wait for such a hypothetical modification. 
 
Further, the Advocate General argues that if the Charter was to be deemed 
inapplicable in situations such as the one in the referred case, then this would 
have consequences beyond the area of visa policy. If the Charter’s applicabil-
ity is made conditional on both territorial and legal connection, then Advocate 
General Mengozzi believes that according to the same logic the vast majority, 
if not the whole, of the Visa Code would also become exempt.  
 
Regarding the question of whether or not EU law requires Member States to 
issue LTV visa, if the alleged humanitarian grounds are deemed well-
founded, Advocate General Mengozzi maintains that while Member States 
retain discretion as regards which humanitarian grounds that preclude Article 
32, this maintained discretion is circumscribed by EU law. Member States’ 
discretion is therefore limited to situations when the appropriate authorities 
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conclude that by refusing to apply Article 25 (1) (a), despite alleged humani-
tarian grounds, this does not infringe the rights in the Charter. If the opposite 
conclusion is reached, that is, that Charter rights are infringed, then such a 
conclusion must preclude the grounds for refusal in Article 32 (1) (b) of the 
Visa Code.283 
7.1.3 Comparing the Court’s and the Advocate General’s 
Conclusions 
As is clear from their arguments above, both the Advocate General and the 
Court agree that the CJEU has jurisdiction to answer the referred questions. 
This despite arguments to the contrary presented both by the Belgian Govern-
ment and the majority of the other Member State Governments participating 
in the hearings. This question of jurisdiction, however, seems to be the extent 
of the agreement between the Advocate General and the Court. 
 
The essential difference between Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion and 
the Court’s judgement is whether or not the situation before the referring court 
can be considered an application for a visa with limited territorial validity in 
accordance with the Visa Code. For, if the situation falls within the scope of 
the Visa Code, this would oblige Member State authorities to act in accord-
ance with the rights guaranteed under the Charter and ECHR. If the opposite 
conclusion is reached, however, not only does the situation before the referred 
court fall outside the scope of the Visa Code, but also outside the scope of EU 
law.  
 
Here, the conclusions in the Advocate General Opinion and the judgement 
seem miles apart. For while the Court considers it apparent that as the purpose 
of the application differs from that of a short-term visa, thus falling outside 
the scope of the EU law, the Advocate General reaches a very different con-
clusion. Contrary to the Court, Advocate General Mengozzi considers that the 
situation in the national court falls within the scope of the Visa Code, and that 
it must be covered by the humanitarian grounds in Article 25 of the Visa 
Code. Further, Mengozzi argues that EU law requires Member States to issue 
an LTV visa, if the alleged humanitarian grounds are well-founded. Espe-
cially striking in the Court’s judgement is its reasoning considering the ap-
plicability of the Charter, where it states that “in particular Articles 4 and 18, 
are not applicable”. Explicitly mentioning the inapplicability of Articles 4 and 
18 seems superfluous, especially considering that the Court had already 
deemed the Charter as a whole inapplicable in the case. 
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7.2 Is the Court taking the politically easy way out? 
Some academics have accused the Court of ‘taking the politically easy way 
out’ and indulging the concerns of the Member States. The explanation for 
this, according to some, is that ruling in favour of the applicability of the Visa 
Code, and thereby the applicability of the Charter, would leave the Court with 
the seemingly impossible task of interpreting the Charter in a way that would 
have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the Dublin System. Further, 
some have expressed confusion as to why the Court has shied away from ex-
tending the applicability of the Charter to those in need of its protection, es-
pecially at a time when EU asylum policy has raised questions concerning the 
Union’s “self-professed dedication to human rights”.284  
 
The Court has further been criticised for answering the referred questions in 
only 14 paragraphs – even fewer if the introductory paragraphs are deducted. 
As one critic put it: 
 
“[c]onsidering the implications of the judgement, and the polemic sur-
rounding this specific case and the EU asylum system as a whole, it 
would have been beneficial to have a deeper insight in the arguments 
and reasoning of the Court.” 285  
 
Furthermore, it is asked why the Court did not take Article 25 of the Visa 
Code into consideration when discussing the scope of the Visa Code. This, as 
many consider the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Article 25, extend 
the meaning of ‘visa’ beyond the definition provided in Article 2 (2) (a) of 
the Visa Code, that is ‘[authorisation] for an intended stay of a duration of no 
more than three months in any six-month period”.286 Here, some argue that 
the concept of ‘visa’ should not be interpreted restrictively, especially as per-
tains to Article 25 of the Visa Code.287 
 
Others have argued that it was: 
 
“[p]ossible for the Court to strike a balance: if it formulated its ruling 
in such a way as to highlight the exceptionality of the circumstances 
that would force Member States to apply Article 25(1) to issue [visas 
with limited territorial validity], despite the fact that there might be rea-
sons to refuse according to Article 32, the EU would honour its obliga-
tions under international and European refugee and human rights law, 
without endangering the function of the CEAS. Such a ruling would 
boost the image of the EU as an advocate of human rights, an image 
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that has been seriously battered by many of the recent EU actions in this 
policy field.”288 
7.3 Is the Court avoiding the question? 
X and X is not the first time that the Court has faced criticism regarding how 
it has dealt with the applicability of the Charter. This was also the case con-
cerning the reforms to national labour law agreed with the so-called troika 
(IMF/European Commission/ECB) as conditions for loans or other financial 
support for Member States in need of bailouts. One such example is the case 
of Portugal, where an Economic Adjustment Programme was negotiated in 
May 2011, and a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter: MoU) and 
Loan Agreement were signed shortly thereafter. This MoU reformed large 
tracts of Portuguese labour law. As a result of this, there were cuts to public 
sector wages, and trade unions argued that these radical reforms to national 
labour law contravened the Charter. 289  
 
As a result of this, the CJEU was referred a series of questions in the case of 
Sindicatos dos Bancários du Norte.290Before the Court had a chance to adju-
dicate, however, the Portuguese Constitutional Court found the public sector 
pay cuts contrary to the equality provision in Article 13 of the Portuguese 
Constitution.291 The CJEU later declined to hear the reference, but not due to 
the fact that the case had already been adjudicated by a national court, but 
because the Court considered it a matter of national law, and not EU law.292 
 
As suggested by Catherine Barnard: 
 
“This suggest a developing twin-track approach: on the one hand the 
Charter will be applied with vigour to non-crisis situations; on the other, 
the Charter will not be applied to rules arising out of the EU’s response 
to the financial and economic crisis. Ultimately, such an approach, with 
crisis related measures in the slow lane, is not legally, politically or 
practically sustainable.”293 
 
This dichotomy between EU law, to which the Charter is deemed applicable 
by the Court, and non-EU law, to which is does not apply, is also interesting 
in the present case. Arguments concerning the scope of EU law, through Ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter, seems to be used by the Court in an attempt to avoid 
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the most sensitive of issues.294 For one cannot help but notice some similari-
ties; a politically sensitive issue, which the Court chooses not to adjudicate, 
with limited argumentation as to why. Whatever the reason, I agree with Cath-
erine Barnard when she states that “[t]his failure is damaging to the long term 
legitimacy of the Union and undermines the Court’s oft-expressed commit-
ment to human rights.”295 
7.4 Potential loopholes? 
Significantly, the Court focuses on the protection seekers’ stated motive in 
the referred case. But in a hypothetical scenario, where the protection seekers 
in the referred case had not stated their intent to apply for asylum upon their 
arrival in Belgium, Belgian authorities might justifiably suspect that they did 
not intend to leave Belgian territory after their visa expires. However, in such 
a hypothetical scenario, the Belgian authorities could only refuse the visa ap-
plication under Article 32 of the Visa Code, thus forcing them to take both 
Article 25 of the Visa Code, and the Charter, into account.296 
 
Here, the Court’s judgement in Koushkaki is especially interesting, as the 
Court in this judgement stated that a Schengen visa may be refused, in ac-
cordance with the Visa Code, if there is reasonable doubt about the intention 
of the protection seeker to leave the territory after the visa expires.297 How-
ever, the Court also highlights that a Schengen visa may only be refused on 
grounds stated in the Visa Code, as acting otherwise might threaten the har-
monisation of the visa rules in the Union. Harmonisation, both as a possible 
solution, or as a reason for the Court to adjudicate in a specific way, is not 
mentioned in the Court’s judgement in X and X.  
 
Specifically, in the Koushkaki case, the Court speaks of a scenario where, if 
the visa rules regarding Schengen visas are not harmonised, protection seek-
ers may indulge in so-called ‘visa shopping’, that is, choosing to apply for 
visas in those EU countries with the most favourable visa rules. Seemingly 
this argument was not taken into consideration by the Court in X and X, and 
the risk of a non-harmonisation of humanitarian visa regulations resulting in 
‘humanitarian visa shopping’ was not mentioned, although this could prove a 
possible future scenario. 
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7.5 Possible Alternatives? 
As suggested above, one way forward for the Court would have been to agree 
with the Advocate General in part, but to highlight the exceptionality of the 
circumstances of the applicants in the national proceedings. In this way, it 
might be possible for the Court to avoid the blow to the Dublin system which 
it is obviously concerned about, but still respect EU’s human rights obliga-
tions. Further, this might re-establish the EU as a regional and global advocate 
of human rights. By doing this, the Court would also offer some well-needed 
clarity, a need articulated by both the Advocate General and experts in the 
field, concerning the ins and outs of Article 25 of the Visa Code and its rela-
tionship with Article 32. Arguably, the Court’s judgement offers little in 
terms of clarification, but instead seems to only create more questions.  
 
As Advocate General Mengozzi points out, the Court had the opportunity to 
clarify Article 25 of the Visa Code, and its relationship with Article 32. This, 
arguably, the Court failed to do, and the very short judgement offers little 
insight into the reasoning behind the Court’s conclusions. Although, perhaps 
it is interesting in itself that the Court seems to have been unable to agree on 
anything more extensive than the brief judgement.  
7.6 Concluding Discussion 
As can be seen in recent years, the popularity of humanitarian visas seems to 
have declined in the EU, and with the Court’s ruling in X and X, the door 
seems to have been firmly shut. However, despite this trend, individual Mem-
ber States have embraced the idea, establishing what are ultimately humani-
tarian visas in various forms.  
 
In this thesis, both the Advocate General’s reasoning and the Court’s judge-
ment have been examined in some detail, but while the Advocate General’s 
Opinion is both interesting and perhaps a cause for reflection, it is ultimately 
just that; an opinion. Unless the Court decides to change its interpretation, its 
judgement stands. So, what does that mean for the future of humanitarian vi-
sas? 
 
It seems that the future for humanitarian visas in the European Union is at a 
crossroads. The concept might continue, in limited or extensive forms, in na-
tional legislation, and therefore be subject to the whims and political will of 
national governments, or it might yet again enter the EU arena through revised 
legislation that explicitly includes humanitarian visas. However, despite the 
European Parliament’s positive stance to PEPs in general, and humanitarian 
visas in particular, most Member States remain sceptical, and in the spirit of 
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protecting the Dublin system and the CEAS in its current form, a change in 
stance on humanitarian visas in the near future appears unlikely. 
 
A further reflection, and perhaps in part a reason behind the Court’s judge-
ment, is that of the effectiveness of EU law. As stated by the Court in its 
ruling, deciding otherwise “would be tantamount to allowing third-country 
nationals to lodge applications for visas on the basis of the Visa Code in order 
to obtain international protection in the Member State of their choice”, which 
the Court points out would also undermine the current Dublin System.298 De-
ciding in line with the reasoning of the Advocate General would mean that 
the Member States’ embassies and representations in third countries would 
have to be able to receive and process such applications for humanitarian vi-
sas, through LTV visa applications regulated in the Visa Code. Currently, no 
such capacity exists in the vast majority of the EU Member States, which 
would make such a system, at least in the beginning, very slow and compli-
cated, and would entail significantly increased costs for the Member States. 
 
As stated by O’Nions it is not surprising, although perhaps regrettable, that 
asylum and illegal migration are linked together in this way. She argues that 
the illegal immigration agenda has prevailed, resulting in a narrow interpre-
tation of asylum as a matter of immigration control and a security concern. 
With 90% of asylum seekers entering Europe in an irregular way, this has 
resulted in the EU receiving criticism for its strong emphasis on security and 
migration control, and the lesser attention given to refugee and human rights, 
along with Member State responsibilities in these areas. This criticism is un-
likely to subside following the Court’s judgement in X and X.299 
 
Another increasingly important building block of the EU asylum system, 
mentioned briefly in both X and X as well as this thesis, is that of safe third 
countries and readmission agreements. In his Opinion, General Advocate 
Mengozzi outright mentions the issue, stating that Lebanon cannot be consid-
ered a safe third country for the applicants to return to. The issue was not 
addressed by the Court in X and X but has been getting increasing traction 
and attention from Member States, at around the same time when humanitar-
ian visas began to fall out of favour.  
 
However, as mentioned above, third safe countries, and the readmission 
agreements that facilitate the practice, have been criticised. For example, due 
to how they may affect the legal certainty of the protection seeker and how 
varying asylum legislation, both within and even more so outside the EU, may 
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result in protection loss for the concerned individual. Finally, such allocation 
mechanisms run the risk of being manipulated by protection seekers, who 
might prefer illegality to readmission.300  
 
It seems that ultimately, the question of the future of humanitarian visas, and 
safe third countries, boils down to the political will and opinion of the Mem-
ber States. With the current political climate in the EU, a revision of the 
Court’s stance in X and X, whether through renewed case law or legislation, 
seems unlikely, and the trend towards increased harmonisation within EU 
asylum legislation momentarily on hold. 
 
However, there might be increased harmonisation of the EU asylum system 
on the horizon, with the Commission aiming to introduce a comprehensive 
deal on migration in June 2018, stating that “the reformed Common European 
Asylum System is essential to ensure that the EU is well prepared to deal with 
any future migratory crises”.301 Thus, only time will tell if the harmonisation 
gap left by the Court in X and X might be filled. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
300 See section 4.1 
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